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The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the following website: http://www.bde.es. Interest rate differences will be evaluated under absolute and relative versions of the Law of One Price. The absolute version of the Law is violated when products that are close substitutes for the buyers sell at difference prices in a persistent way. Thus, the study of interest differences across banks and/or product classes in loans or deposits will indicate whether markets are integrated or not. But persistent interest rate differences can be possible because of, for example, idiosyncratic bank factors that cannot be arbitraged away. Then, market integration can be evaluated from the speed at which temporary deviations from the long-term across-banks interest differences are eliminated (i.e. the relative version of the Law of One Price).
The paper is in line with research on convergence of interest rates and evolution of market power in retail banking within the EU countries [see Baele et al. (2004) for an overview]. But with the advantage that we have very disaggregated data for practically the whole industry (95% of the loans and deposits), and a long period of time. Therefore, we can address questions such as the contribution to interest rate differentiation of time, bank, product and geographic market effects, not explored so far. Second, we can isolate the effects on the evolution of interest rate dispersion of changes in monetary conditions and changes in marginal opportunity costs of loans and marginal revenues from deposits.
From the test of the relative version of the Law of One Price we are able to obtain the long term relative mark up over opportunity cost of loans and the relative mark down over revenue from deposits. Therefore, the analysis of interest rate dispersion also provides known about the effect of credit risk premiums in the interest rate/gross margin at the product-bank level. One important limitation to study market power in loan markets is that credit risk premium data are difficult to find. Using Banco de España Credit Register database, we are able to compute bank and loan product level data on ex post credit risk that can be used to estimate the risk adjusted opportunity cost of the loans. Therefore, we provide risk adjusted long term mark up estimates for loans of different maturities. 4 Since interest rates and cost data refer to a single country, the contribution to the evaluation of European banking integration is only indirect. One important result of this analysis is that banks' idiosyncratic effects are an important source of interest rate differentiation. Moreover, in loan products, the relative contribution of bank effects to differentiation increases over time. If the same pattern can be expected at supra national level, European cross country convergence in loan interest rates may not be the most appropriate benchmark to follow up the process of retail banking integration, unless all banks end up with similar credit risk in their portfolios. Second, we find that the (long term) Lerner index of loans, a conventional measure of market power, is substantially reduced when the marginal cost used in the computation of the index includes the credit risk premium of each bank-loan observation, which confirms the relevance of product and bank level variables to explain differences in interest rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the data and a preliminary evidence of interest rate differentiation in Spanish retail banking.
Section 3 focuses on the absolute version of the Law of One Price through the evaluation of the contribution to dispersion in profit margins of sources of potential differentiation (Time, Bank, Product and Province). Section 4 presents a test of the relative version the Law of One
Price and estimates of the long-term relative difference between interest rates and opportunity costs for each of the bank products. In section 5 we summarize the conclusions of the paper. 2 Description of the data and preliminary evidence on interest rate dispersion
Database
Data on interest rates come from the confidential returns that Commercial and Savings banks send monthly to the Banco de España on interest rates for loan and deposit operations made during the previous month. The interest rate reported by a bank on a given product is the weighted average of equivalent annual interest rates set in all operations made in that product during the corresponding month. So, banks report actual (i.e. marginal) interest rates charged in the transactions. The raw data has been filtered to eliminate inactive banks and to assure a minimum number of annual observations for each bank and product.
Banks with tiny market share (less than 1 over 10,000 in terms of total assets) have been excluded from the analysis. Branches of foreign banks, which concentrate mainly in the wholesale market are also excluded, since our focus is on retail banking. Only Mortgages have all long-term maturity (above 3 years) but the rest of loan products have different maturities. Loans are grouped by maturity: less than one month, from 1 to 3 months, from 3 months to 1 year, from 1 year to 3 years and more than 3 years. Deposit products include Current Accounts (sight deposits with check facilities), Saving accounts (sight deposits with no check facilities), Deposits and Repo type deposits (deposits backed by the bank with a government security debt instrument). Banks do not report Current and Saving Accounts that pay negligible interest rates. 5 Current and Saving accounts are considered high liquidity products, while Deposits can be of high, medium or low liquidity depending on the reimbursement period (less than 3 months, from 3 months to 2 years and more than 2 years, respectively). Repo type products can be of medium liquidity, from 3 months to 2 years and of high liquidity, less than 3 months. province, and Regional, all the rest. In late 1988, the last regulation that limited the geographical expansion of Savings banks was removed. Since then, Savings banks have been very active in opening branches outside their historical territories and, thus, increasing the number of competitors in local markets. As a consequence, province level market concentration has been stable over time in spite of the mergers of very large banks that have taken place during the period. 7 In the paper merged banks are considered a new bank from the moment the merger occurs and separated institutions before it.
In retail banking, markets are local for most products and services. The information available on interest rates is not disaggregated enough to know the town or city where bank operations are made. Therefore, we do not know the interest rates in different geographic markets, except when the bank concentrates most of its business in a single province. In each province there are local and national banks operating through branches. We assume that a national bank sets the same interest rate of a particular product in all provinces where it operates. With this assumption and the observed interest rates charged by the local banks in the province we can test if Province markets contribute or not to interest rate differentiation.
Preliminary evidence on interest rate levels and dispersion
The evolution over time of interest rate levels for loan and deposit products are presented in Figure 1 . Values shown are averages across all banks and maturities of each product in the corresponding quarter. It is clear that the driving force behind the decline in interest rates during the sample period has been the decline in official interest rates, represented in Figure 1 by the one-day interbank rate. In loan products, the absolute difference between the interest rates charged by banks and the interbank rate has been rather stable, while in deposits it was very high in the first part of the sample ant it is substantially reduced at the end of it. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the estimated coefficient of variation, a dispersion measure, for selected loan and deposit products across banks. In Mortgages dispersion stays stable over time since 1993, while for the other three products, Credit Line, Current Accounts and Deposits, interest rate dispersion across banks increases over time.
Taking all products, interest rate dispersion is represented by the histograms in relative range of interest rates above 50%. Dispersion seems to increase over time. In the 1989-1993 period, the relative range of interest rates was above 50% in only 15% of the bank quarterly observations, raising to 20% in 1994-1998 and to 40% in the last five-year period.
The separated histograms for loans and for deposits, not shown, confirm that dispersion increases over time in both type of bank products.
Information on level and dispersion of interest rates is summarized in Table 2 .
The rows under "Differentials" include, for all products, as well as separated for loans and deposits, the average difference between the interest rate and the one-day interbank rate both in quarter t, and also this average difference relative to the interest rate of the respective loan or deposit. "Dispersion Measures" shown are, average differences between the 90 th and 10 th interest rate percentiles in period t divided by the average interest 7. The Herfindahl index of market concentration in total loans, average across the 50 provinces, has been stable around 0.10.
rate, and the average coefficients of variation from the distribution of interest rates in each quarter t. From this preliminary evidence, including histograms and the summary of We cannot observe interest rates at the geographical ( The official interest rate set by Banco de España (and from 1999 onwards by the Euro-system) and the interbank money market interest rate around it, sets a reference for bank interest rates in retail markets. Since individual banks are price takers in that market, they face a perfectly elastic demand of funds for the money received as deposits, and a perfectly elastic supply of funds for their loans. The interbank interest rate separates deposit from loan markets and interest rates are set in each market independently of the other. 8 The equilibrium interest rate of loans and deposits will be a function of the interbank interest rate, common to all banks but changing over time. Of course, money market conditions are not the only macroeconomic conditions that can affect interest rates in retail banking.
Inflation, business cycle, and economic specialization, are also relevant factors to consider which, among other things, can affect credit and the ex ante risk premium charged by banks in their loan products. Our analysis of interest rate differences will isolate time effects common to all banks.
Methodology
The main purpose of this section is to evaluate systematic interest rate differences across Product class, Maturity, Liquidity, Bank, Province and Time, over the 1989-2003 time period.
We also want to evaluate the contribution of each source of potential differentiation to the total variance observed in interest rates. The framework of analysis is static in the sense that short-term deviations of interest rates from their long-term levels due to temporary shocks are ignored. They will be the main focus of the next section.
The evaluation will be made combining regression and analysis of variance. Our data allows us to compute interest rate differences for each product and each peer of banks every quarter, but to work with all bilateral differences is unpractical. One possibility is to evaluate the differences relative to the average of interest rates across all banks for each product.
The other is to choose a particular market as a benchmark and explain interest rates spreads with the comparison market. The second alternative is more attractive, especially if the benchmark chosen is considered a highly competitive market. Then, differences in prices with respect to the benchmark can be easily translated into welfare losses. In this paper, the benchmark market and the reference interest rate are the interbank market and the one-day interbank interest rate respectively. When computing differences with respect to the interbank interest rate, we remove from the interest rates of individual banks and products the common time effects introduced by the evolution of monetary conditions over time.
Interest rate differences can be evaluated in absolute or in relative terms. In our empirical analysis all interest rates are expressed in logs, and, thus, the difference with respect to the benchmark is in percentage or relative terms. The basic models to be estimated for loan and deposit products are formulated as follows Table 3 presents evidence on the explanation of interest rate differentials obtained from the estimation of model (1) Classes and 3 Maturity (see Table 3 ). To avoid perfect collineality among the explanatory dummy variables, loans with Variable interest rate of less than one month maturity in Madrid by a large bank have been excluded from the explanatory variables of the regression. years period and a differential 37.7 % higher in the last one.
Dispersion of interest rate differentials. Stability over time and systematic differences across products, maturity, liquidity and type of banks
Relative differences in interest rates with respect to the interbank interest rate also vary systematically with loan maturity. Controlling for Product classes, the highest average differences appear in intermediate maturity, 3 months to 3 years. The pattern of the average differences is very similar in the second and the third period, which indicates that term structure of interest rates in loans has been quite stable since 1994.
Commercial and Savings banks start practically even in terms of relative differences of their respective interest rates with respect to the interbank interest rate, but at the end of the period the latter have 9.3% higher relative differences, on average, than the former.
Differences between National and the rest of banks remain non-economically significant contribution is after taking away from the trend in interest rate the evolution of the interbank rate. The sharpest decline in the interbank rate occurs during the years 1994-1998 of nominal convergence before joining the Euro zone, precisely the period when Time shows the lowest contribution to explained variance. After 1998 the Time contribution to explained variance increases again and, thus, the introduction of the Euro only marginally reduced the effect of macroeconomic conditions on interest rate formation compared with the effect in the pre Euro period of 1989-1993.
Product class and Banks increase their respective partial contribution to explained variance from 18% in the period 1989-1993 to around 22% the rest of the time the former, and from 28% to 41% the latter. Maturity decreases its partial contribution to explained variance over time being of just 0.8% in the last period. Overall, the pattern of contributions to explained variance by all the sources of differentiation considered remains stable since 1994.
It looks as if the pattern of differences in loan interest rates was already set in the period of nominal convergence and the Euro has consolidated that with little changes. The emerging pattern has as one of its distinct features the high contribution to explained variance of the variable Banks. In a period of decreasing and finally historically low interest rates banks may have had incentives to differentiate their offer of products in order to increase customer loyalty and reduce effective competition. Table 4 presents the result of estimating model (1) lower than the differential of highly liquid deposits and, thus, the former pay higher interest rate than the later. The structure of interest rates on deposits has changed over time in an economically meaningful direction.
The persistent observed average differentials between Saving and Current accounts (the former pay lower interest than the latter) are more difficult to justify since both provide the same liquidity and the latter offers, in addition, checking facilities to the depositor. One possible explanation is that banks use Saving and Current accounts to better segment the market, offering the latter to more sophisticated consumers and the former to less indicates that price differentials from external shocks will last a shorter period of time.
The methodology is based on estimating a partial adjustment model for each bank product controlling for bank specific effects and for common time varying external shocks.
The partial adjustment model allows us to estimate not only the speed of convergence of each interest rate spread in response to external shocks, but also its long-term limit value.
Therefore, we present evidence on across-bank long-term interest rate differentials and their evolution in the three time periods.
Speed of interest rate adjustment and long term interest rate differential are estimated using two different benchmarks, the one day interbank interest rate and the estimated marginal opportunity cost/revenue for each bank product. If products are homogeneous from the point of view of the buyer then differences in marginal costs across banks will not affect the selling price of the product which will be necessarily the same for all banks. When products are differentiated across banks and in general when banks have market power, differences in marginal costs translate in additional differences in price.
Second, when the interest rate differential is computed with respect to marginal cost then the differential is the relative profit margin.
Comparing the results of speed of adjustment and long term interest rate differential with each benchmark we are in fact analyzing interest rate convergence on the one hand and relative profit margin convergence on the other. Additionally, if we conclude that the dynamics of interest rates is better explained by the dynamics of marginal costs than by the dynamics of the interbank rate, this would be evidence that banks have market power since bank prices vary with their respective marginal costs. Finally, some of the price differentials across products from Tables 3 and 4, differences between Mortgages and Personal loans or between Savings and Current accounts for example, can be due to differences in marginal costs across products and if these differences are eliminated then the remaining one will be close to the market power of banks in each product-market.
Marginal cost of loans includes a risk free interest rate of equal maturity than the respective loan product plus an estimated risk premium that accounts for the credit risk of the bank and product. The risk premium is estimated for each bank, loan product and year using data on defaults. For deposits, we substitute the one day interbank interest rate by the interest rate of a risk free investment opportunity for the bank of equal maturity than the respective deposit. The value of β =α−1 is the Beta-convergence estimate of a product, that can be directly related, in absolute value, to the speed of convergence. A lower estimated α imply a faster Beta convergence, that is a higher speed in the process by which transitory shocks to interest rates get eliminated and interest differentials return to their long term values.
Speed of adjustment and long-term interest rate differential
The estimated value of the coefficient α provides the β (α-1) convergence value for the period 1989-1993. The β convergence values of the other two five-year periods are given by (α+γ1-1) and (α+γ2-1), respectively. Negative (positive) γ1 and/or γ2 coefficients will indicate that convergence is faster (slower) in the respective five-year periods than in the first period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) . In other words, that interest rate adheres more (less) intensively to the relative version of the Law of One Price than in the first period.
Long-term relative interest rate differentials across banks for each product can be obtained by solving the equation of model (2) when dependent variables had reached their long-term value, yt = yt-1. Solving the model under this condition the long-term value of the interest rate differential is equal to δ/(1-α). Since we allow for different intercepts across banks (δ + η i ) and time periods, and for changes in α in each time period, the long-term interest rate differentials will be computed using values of δ obtained averaging the estimated intercepts across banks and quarters for each product and each time period, and values of α corresponding to the respective time period.
Model (2) will be estimated in first differences with instrumental variables using Arellano and Bond (1988) panel data estimation technique, which chooses as instruments lags of the dependent variable uncorrelated with the error term. Table 5 reports the estimated values of α, γ 1 and γ 2 for each of the 25 different products, which correspond to the test of the relative version of the Law of One Price.
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The null hypothesis of no beta-convergence (α =1) is rejected at a level of significance of 5% or less for all products. So, deviations from long term differentials due to external shocks seem to generate a process of convergence back to long term values.
Estimated coefficients of the cross effect variables, γ 1 and γ 2 , are some times non-significant, sometimes positive and sometimes negative ( Table 5 ), so that no clear conclusion is reached on whether the adherence to the relative version of the law of One Price has increased over time. We also observe that the statistics from the test of second-order autocorrelation are relatively high for many loan products (i.e. we reject the hypothesis of non-autocorrelation at 1% in many cases). This means that there exists some idiosyncratic component within each bank in the motion of interest rate differentials that is not properly accounted for in the model specification. In the next section we show that this idiosyncratic component has to do with the credit risk premium of each bank and loan product that is not totally controlled by the bank specific effect (market power). Table 5 are summarized in Table 6 Long term loans, especially Mortgages, show lower speed of adjustment than short term loans. The speed of adjustment is higher for low liquidity than for high liquidity deposits. Among product classes, the slowest convergence occurs in Mortgages and Current Accounts, and the fastest in Credit Line and Repo type deposits. Estimated coefficients on the cross effect variables, γ 1 and γ 2 , are sometimes non-significant, sometimes positive and sometimes negative (Table 6 ). In comparison with the speed of convergence over 1989-1993, ten years later the speed of convergence has increased for three of the four deposit products and has decreased for all loan products. Therefore, interest rates for deposits increase the adherence to the relative version of the Law of One
Estimated coeffcients of model (2) shown in
Price and the interest rates of loans decrease its adherence.
12. Alternative estimations with pooled data for loans, deposits, loans (deposits) of given maturity (liquidity) were disregarded because all tests of equal model coefficients across pooled products rejected the null hypothesis at high levels of statistical significance. Besides, second order autocorrelation increased compared with that shown in Table 5 . 13. Goldberg and Verboven (2004) obtain half-life values of 0.7 for car prices in Europe.
In Table 6 we also show the implicit average long term differentials Accounts. Overall, the results from Table 6 are consistent with the descriptive information in Table 3 , which reported an increase over time in relative interest rate differentials for loan products and a minor reduction in interest rate differential for deposits.
Explaining differences in interest rate differentials: Convergence in mark-ups
The second part of the dynamic analysis will focus on explaining the evolution of interest rate differentials by looking at what part of that evolution can be attributed to changes in the opportunity cost of loans and to the marginal revenue of deposits. We assume that loan and deposit markets are separated and banks maximize profits in each of them. In the loan market, profits are equal to revenue from the interest rate charged in loans, less the opportunity cost of lending the funds, which is equal to the credit risk adjusted interest rate of a secured investment of same maturity than the loan. For deposits, profit is given by the risk free investments of equal maturity, minus the interest rate paid to the deposits. Each Given the risk free interest rate of a given maturity i, the opportunity cost of the loan is the interest rate il that solves the equation,
where PD is the probability that the loan will default and LGD is the loss given default, the amount of the loan that the bank will never recover. Solving the equation we obtain the opportunity cost for each bank and product,
LGD PD
LGD
14. Long term differentials are equal to 1 δ α − , where δ and α come from the estimates reported in Table 5 : the slope α is the one reported in the mark up are interesting by themselves because they are directly related to the degree of market integration and the market power of banks, respectively.
Estimated slope coefficients for this variation on model (2), for each of the 25 products, are presented in Table 7 . Convergence in mark ups is rejected in six cases (i.e. α is statistically equal to 1). This happens mostly in the first time period and always in loan products. In Personal loans with maturity over 3 years, the null hypothesis of α=1 is not rejected in any of the periods. Second, the speed of convergence starts very low in the 1989-1993 period, with relatively high values of the slope coefficient, particularly for loan products, but it increases over time since estimated coefficients for the cross variables (γ1 and γ2) are negative and in many cases statistically significant. In addition second order autocorrelation is rejected in all products and confirms the consistence of the parameter estimates when convergence is evaluated relative to opportunity costs or revenues.
The summary of results in Table 8 Table 8 we can say that the increase in speed of adjustment for loans, negative γ, after 1994 obeys to faster reaction under changes in credit risk conditions in loan markets; in other words, to possible changes in the credit policies of banks.
The speed of adjustment is higher (lower estimated α) for Mortgages than for loans of other maturity, specially in the first and the third time periods. In all other cases, speed of adjustment decreases as loan maturity increases (the main difference appears to be between maturity of more and less than one year). 16 Since the interest rates are marginal rates, the pattern of speed of adjustment across loans of different maturity probably reflects the smoothing practice of banks in the transmission of interest rates of loans to changes in costs, consistent with the practice of relational lending, Berger and Udell (1992).
Long-term equilibrium mark ups (in logs) of loans, Table 8 , are much lower (by a factor of 3) than interest rate differentials shown in Table 6 . The increase over time in relative 16. We have performed tests of equal weighted averages of speed of adjustment for loans and for deposits products and for loans of low and high maturity. The z statistic of the test is computed taking into account the variance covariance matrix of all the estimated coefficients weighted in the comparison. In both cases the null hypothesis of no difference was rejected (z = -2.59 and z = 7.51, respectively).
spreads with respect to interbank rate, Table 6 , are due in an important part to the fact that the credit risk premium over the risk free interest rate does not decrease at the same path as the risk free interest rate. Banks' interest rates in loans respond to marginal costs of the bank and this creates dispersion in interest rates and in differentials with respect to the one day interbank rate, violating the absolute version of the Law of One Price.
In loans of more than 3 years, excluded Mortgages, in loans between 1 and 3 months and in Credit lines, the long term mark up is below 1 (negative log of mark up) during the four-year period 1989-1993 (and in two cases also in 1994-1998). These are years of high credit risk and high rate of defaults in bank loans (Figure 4 ) that apparently banks' credit policies did not anticipated at the time the loan was granted. In recent years all loan products have a positive contribution to gross profits. The equilibrium mark up in loans is higher in the third time period, 1999-2003, than in the first one, 1989-1993, evidence that suggests an increase in market power of banks in loan products over time.
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On average, the mark down in deposits is similar in the first and the last periods, around 0.40. During the 1994-1998 period the mark down is lower, implying less market power and presumably higher competition. Current Accounts, and specially Saving Accounts, are the deposit products with higher mark down, suggesting they have the less competitive markets. Since in the profit-maximizing price the Lerner index is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of demand, the index is 20%. 18. The actual mark down applied to the risk free interest rate that determines the marginal revenue the bank obtains from deposits is the inverse of the anti log of the long term value shown in Table 9 . For the 0.4 value, the mark down is 0.67 [exp(-0.40)]. This implies an elasticity of supply of deposits of 2 and a Lerner index of 50%.
Conclusion
Interest rate differentiation is a persistent phenomenon in Spanish retail banking, a situation that has not changed substantially with the introduction of the Euro. Differences in interest rates persist across banks and between product classes in both loans and deposits. The evidence found in the paper casts some doubts on whether Spanish retail banking can be considered a single market from the point of view of the absolute version of the Law of One Price, a conclusion that should moderate the expectations about future European banking integration. Dispersion is higher in loans than in deposits, especially due to bank specific effects that reflect heterogeneity in banks' credit policies. Among these policies, Another relevant result of the paper is that conventional measures of market power such as relative profit margins or the Lerner index increase over time in all loan products and remain stable in deposits with the exception of Repo type deposits, for which it decreases.
Other than by the decline in interest rates and absolute profit margins during the period of study, the evidence does not support that market power of Spanish banks has decreased in a significant way. This conclusion is reached even when margins are computed over credit risk adjusted opportunity costs of loans. Same caveats are however in order. Note: There are some cells to which we have assigned more than one single product. On the loan side, Loans at variable interest rate of less than 1 month and from 1 to 3 months are grouped under the maturity label of "< 3 m". On the deposit side, Deposit from 3 to 6 months, 6 months to 1 year, 1 year to 2 years and Repo operations from 3 months to 6 months and 6 months to 1 year are grouped under the "Medium" liquidity label. Intercept estimates refer to deposits with high liquidity in Madrid for a large bank. c We show the ratio of partial sum of squares of each group with respect to the sum of squares of the model, which explains why they do not add up to 1. Slope coefficients are weighted averages of those in Table 6 . Long term mark up are averages of δ/(1-α), also from The null hypothesis of α = 1 cannot be rejected at p values of 10% for Credit Lines 1 year-3 years (first period) and for Personal loans 3 months-1 year (first period), 1 year -3 years (first period), more 3 years (all periods).
γ 2 Slope coefficients are weighted averages of those in Table 8 . Long term mark up are averages of δ/(1-α), also from 
